Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance: does it impact their perception of markets and themselves? by Menkhoff, Lukas & Nikiforow, Marina
www.ssoar.info
Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance:
does it impact their perception of markets and
themselves?
Menkhoff, Lukas; Nikiforow, Marina
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Menkhoff, L., & Nikiforow, M. (2009). Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance: does it impact their perception
of markets and themselves? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2), 318-329. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jebo.2009.04.004
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292291
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance: Does
it impact their perception of markets and themselves?
Authors: Lukas Menkhoff, Marina Nikiforow
PII: S0167-2681(09)00111-5
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.004
Reference: JEBO 2370
To appear in:
Received date: 28-2-2007
Revised date: 15-4-2009
Accepted date: 15-4-2009
Please cite this article as: Menkhoff, L., Nikiforow, M., Professionals’ endorsement of
behavioral finance: Does it impact their perception of markets and themselves?, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization (2008), doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.004
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 26
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance: Does it impact 
their perception of markets and themselves?
Lukas Menkhoff and Marina Nikiforow
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany
Abstract
This paper provides evidence on the hypothesis that many behavioral finance patterns are so 
deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by learning. We test this 
on a target group which has undoubtedly very strong incentives to learn efficient behavior, 
i.e. fund managers. We split this group into endorsers and non-endorsers of behavioral 
finance. Endorsers do, indeed, view markets differently as they regard stronger influences 
from behavioral biases. However, when it comes to the perception of one’s own behavior the 
endorsement of behavioral finance becomes almost meaningless, even though endorsers oth-
erwise do adapt behavior towards their conviction.
JEL codes: G 10 (general financial markets), D 83 (learning, knowledge, belief)
Keywords: behavioral finance, fund managers, biases
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Professionals’ endorsement of behavioral finance: Does it impact
their perception of markets and themselves?
1. Introduction
The history of many anomalies in financial markets has shown that they disappear over 
time (Fama, 1998). This has raised the suspicion that markets may need time to recognize 
such anomalies – which largely motivate behavioral finance – but that they react consequent-
ly afterwards. According to this view one may assess behavioral finance being largely con-
cerned with transitory phenomena. Others argue that many behavioral finance patterns are so 
deeply rooted in human behavior that they are difficult to overcome by learning (Alpert and 
Raiffa, 1982, Fischhoff, 1982b, Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, and more recently Hirshleifer, 
2001). Obviously, these two views make contrary predictions on the persistence of behavior-
al phenomena although both camps agree that in the long run fundamentals drive prices. If 
rational learning is dominant then one could expect that insights into behavioral finance im-
pact one’s own behavior. If, however, learning mechanisms are weak in this respect the in-
sights into behavioral finance will have a minor impact on one’s own behavior. We provide a 
test of these competing views and find evidence in support of the latter hypothesis put for-
ward by psychologists working in behavioral decision-making and more recently by beha-
vioral economists.1
Our research aims for extending literature in psychology which has clearly revealed the 
“bias blind spot” (Pronin et al., 2002), i.e. the belief that one’s own judgments are less sus-
ceptible to biases than the judgments of others.2 We extend this research by addressing an 
important objection that economists might voice against evidence based on student surveys: 
The probability that behavioral biases hold depends on how strong incentives are to learn and 
thus to overcome entrenched behavior. One can easily imagine circumstances where people 
adhere to behavioral patterns as forecast by behavioral finance just because their welfare is 
not at stake. It seems therefore advisable for an empirical examination of the hypothesis put 
forward by psychologists and behavioral economists to choose a target group that has un-
                                                
1  Nowadays it is widely accepted that behavioral finance builds on two concepts, i.e. “investor psychology” and
“limits to arbitrage” (see Shleifer and Summers, 1990, Barberis and Thaler, 2002).
2 This asymmetry arises from the stance of “naive realism” as well as from different strategies people apply to 
detect bias in own judgments versus the judgments of others (Pronin et al., 2004, see also Ehrlinger et al, 2005). 
Recent research in this line includes adding individual’s self-image to the utility function (Johansson-Stenman 
and Martinsson, 2006).
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doubtedly strong incentives to learn. We have thus targeted professional fund managers. 
Their investment performance is on the one hand negatively affected by behavioral biases
(see e.g. Shefrin and Statman, 1985, Coval and Shumway, 2005, Biais and Weber, 2007) and 
on the other permanently monitored and linked to high performance-related bonuses. Among 
these fund managers we differentiate between “endorsers” of behavioral finance and others, 
who we call “non-endorsers”.
Endorsers of behavioral finance are those fund managers who believe that the approach 
of behavioral finance truly reflects decision behavior in fund management (and who know 
the key messages of behavioral finance well). In contrast to them are non-endorsers, i.e. fund 
managers who are not that much convinced about the relevance of behavioral finance. We 
have surveyed more than 100 fund managers in Germany and classify them according to their 
self-assessment into these two groups. We then analyze whether fund managers’ endorse-
ment of behavioral finance, i.e. being an “endorser”, impacts their perception of markets and 
themselves: Do these groups respond in the same way to questionnaire items addressing, 
first, their perception of general fund managers’ behavior and, second, their perception of 
their own behavior with respect to issues being raised by behavioral finance research?
We find a revealing split in responses: Whereas endorsers recognize significantly 
stronger behavioral finance effects in other fund managers’ behavior than non-endorsers, the 
perception of their own behavior is largely unaffected by their insights. When endorsers are 
asked about their own behavior with respect to items being linked to behavioral finance, such 
as hindsight bias or disposition effect, they answer as non-endorsers do. However, there is 
one exception to this pattern: Endorsers show less miscalibration with respect to forecasting 
the interval of a stock index. As less miscalibration here also means more correct answers, 
this suggests that endorsers’ conviction of behavioral finance may increase awareness for re-
spective distortions and can improve decisions to some extent.
In a final exercise, we analyze whether endorsers’ assessment of their own behavior 
may reflect the fact that behavioral finance does not influence their decisions in any respect. 
Therefore, we ask whether endorsers differ from non-endorsers regarding two further items 
of investment behavior, i.e. their preferred information sources and investment strategies. We 
find that both groups seem to differ clearly in their use of information sources although not to 
a statistically significant extent. The difference becomes significant, however, with respect to 
preferred investment strategies as endorsers rely more on momentum and contrarian strate-
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gies. We conclude that endorsers do not generally behave like non-endorsers, making the 
above found indifference between both groups with respect to their self-assessment more 
credible.
Thus, we come back to the hypothesis – proposed by psychologists and behavioral 
economists – that many behavioral patterns are difficult to overcome by learning. Our find-
ings provide support for his view as insight into behavioral finance and thus into the behavior 
of others does not easily change one’s own behavior. We regard it as an important and inno-
vative aspect of our research that this result has been found among fund managers because 
this target group has strong incentives to improve behavior. In this respect we also find a par-
tial justification for Fama’s (1998) optimism into learning processes in that the endorsement
of behavioral finance reduces miscalibration.
The remaining study is structured into four sections. Section 2 describes data of the 
questionnaire survey. The following sections present our analyses, starting with views on the 
market’s behavior (Section 3), then views on one’s own behavior (Section 4) and, finally, 
consequences on investment behavior (Section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
This study is based on a questionnaire survey that addressed all relevant fund manage-
ment companies in Germany between August 15 and December 12, 2002 and yielded a use-
ful and largely representative sample.
In total, out of the 59 relevant fund management companies 35 participated in the sur-
vey, with at least one appropriate questionnaire each. This resulted in a response rate of 59% 
concerning participated fund management companies.3
To ensure the reliability of responses many intensive interviews with fund managers 
were conducted in advance of the survey. These interviews served to formulate questions in 
an appropriate manner. Furthermore, in later stages the questionnaire was used in a pre-test 
with several fund managers as a final check of its acceptance and appropriateness. Feedback 
indicates that the response is useful for our research purpose.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 provide a picture of personal characteristics of the 
respondents in this survey. Accordingly, the mean of responding fund managers shows an 
age of about 35 years, has professional experience of ten years, is of male gender, earns a bo-
                                                
3 The structure of this response is largely similar to the industry’s structure. Our sample is representative in this 
sense (see Appendix 1).
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nus payment of 25%, has a university degree, works rather in a non-governing position, prac-
tices active fund management and manages stocks rather than bonds. This data is consistent 
with the information from similar surveys in Germany such as Menkhoff (1998) or Arnswald 
(2001).
As basis for the formation of groups our questionnaire contains two useful statements 
on behavioral finance, i.e. endorsement and knowledge of behavioral finance. These state-
ments are given in Table 2 as BF1 and BF2, both of which are assessed by 6 answering cate-
gories, ranging from “complete approval” (coded as 1) to “complete contradiction” (coded as 
6). The main information we use from these statements is the degree of endorsement of be-
havioral finance as it is expressed in the response to BF1. Due to the distribution of answers
(see the contingency table in Table 2) we define endorsers by comprising answering catego-
ries 1 and 2, whereas category 3 seems to characterize an intermediate stance in comparison 
to the sample. We complement this definition by information from BF2, i.e. we define that 
endorsers should also know the key messages of behavioral finance well (corresponding to 
answering categories 1 and 2 again).4 3 persons are not considered further in the analysis be-
cause they say to be convinced of behavioral finance (responding to BF1 with answering 
category 2) but have only limited knowledge about it (responding to BF2 with answering 
category 3 or 4).5 Due to this definition based on answers to BF1 and BF2, the group of en-
dorsers consists of 37 fund managers whereas the group of non-endorsers consists of 67 fund 
managers. Both groups are framed in the contingency table in Table 2.
As we aim for a comparison of endorsers with non-endorsers we use the descriptive 
items given in Table 1 in order to find out about differences in personal characteristics. Inte-
restingly, the results in Table 3 don’t disclose any such difference to be statistically signifi-
cant or even close to significance. Thus, the endorsement to behavioral finance is not closely 
related to personal characteristics, such as being older or holding a better position etc. In or-
der to test the robustness of this result we also run a binary probit regression where the varia-
                                                
4  Thus non-endorsers share the belief that behavioral finance does not reflect decision behavior in fund man-
agement quite well (statement BF1). However, two groups may be distinguished with respect to statement BF2, 
i.e. their knowledge about behavioral finance. Splitting responses into those non-endorsers who know behav-
ioral finance well (categories 1 and 2) and the others (categories 3 and more) gives groups with 32 and 35 fund 
managers, respectively. We have thus repeated all analyses with three groups (endorsers and two kinds of non-
endorsers) in order to see whether the behavioral finance knowledge of non-endorsers may be a driving force in 
understanding them. But results remain almost unchanged and are thus robust in this respect. Only the level of 
significance is sometimes negatively affected by smaller sample size.
5  There are another 7 fund managers who did not answer BF1 or BF2 in a useful way so that sample size is re-
duced from 114 to 107.
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ble “endorser vs. non-endorser” is “explained” by available personal characteristics. The last 
two columns in Table 3 show that there is also no significant relation in this multivariate ap-
proach. As endorsers of behavioral finance do not represent a particular sub-group among 
fund managers, we do not control for personal characteristics in our further research.
3. Views on market’s behavior
We ask fund managers to express their view on the behavior of other fund managers, 
i.e. the market, with respect to effects stated by behavioral finance. We find consistently that 
endorsers observe these effects significantly stronger than non-endorsers.
In order to systemize the variety of human behavioral biases Hirshleifer (2001) follows 
earlier studies of psychologists (see e.g. Alpert and Raiffa, 1982, Fischhoff, 1982b) and as-
signs biases either to the process of judgment or to the process of decision-making. Analogi-
cally, we ask for fund managers’ response to statements [1] and [2], that serve to detect the 
judgment biases house money effect and confirmatory bias, and their response to statements 
[3] to [5] that rather describe the decision biases reflection effect, home bias and herding. Ta-
ble 4 presents the five statements we are analyzing and which we motivate in the following 
before going into results.
3.1 Motivation
Statement [1] in Table 4 addresses the house money effect caused by the mechanisms of 
heuristic simplification. Simplification becomes active because of the restraints in human in-
formation-processing capabilities due to which the complexity of the available basis of in-
formation is reduced by filtering out apparently irrelevant facts. By thus simplifying the in-
formation-input for decision-making perception of reality gets biased (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1982). This can result in suboptimal decisions. In this context, house money effect de-
scribes the phenomenon that investors become less loss-averse and more likely to take risks 
when reinvesting recently made profits. The psychological explanation for this bias is that the 
perceived discomfort in case of a loss of the recently earned money is diminished by the fact 
that it was a gain before (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
Statement [2] aims at the confirmatory bias which is attributed to the natural mechan-
ism of self-deception. After a decision people tend to collect decision-confirming information 
thereby ignoring contrary evidence (Pronin, 2007). The confirmatory bias describes the ob-
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servation that people are prone to interpret even ambiguous information in favor of their ear-
lier decision. These natural mechanisms of selective information perception interfere with ra-
tional learning, including the recognition of and learning from one’s own mistakes. The mo-
tivation for the confirmatory bias is to preserve self-respect of the decider as well as to avoid 
regret and thus unpleasant feelings after decision-making (Festinger, 1957, Nickerson, 1998).
Statements [3] to [5] mention decision biases. Statement [3] serves to detect the reflec-
tion effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), grasped here by risk seeking behavior in case of 
loss positions. The reflection effect describes the dependence of investors’ risk attitude on the 
sign of the outcome, i.e. whether the outcomes are gains or losses. It is included in prospect 
theory by the s-shape of the value function: concave for gains indicating risk aversion and 
convex for losses indicating risk seeking. This bias partly contributes to explain the disposi-
tion effect. The preference to invest in near located markets, the home bias (statement [4]), is 
explained – in the behavioral finance approach – by the human preference for familiarity, 
which evokes the feeling of possessing more relevant information about the home market and 
thus being more competent to forecast (Kilka and Weber, 2000, Lütje and Menkhoff, 2007). 
The third decision bias addressed here with statement [5] is herding. It is understood as the
phenomenon that fund managers may imitate the investment decision of others and thereby 
ignore their own valuable information (see Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001).
3.2 Results
Regarding the results in Table 4 we detect significant differences between endorsers 
and non-endorsers concerning the intensity of perception of biases in their colleagues’ beha-
vior and thereby in the market. This finding applies to the two judgmental biases, i.e. house 
money effect and confirmatory bias, and to the three decisional biases as well, i.e. reflection 
effect, home bias and herding.
In all five cases endorsers recognize the biases significantly stronger than non-
endorsers, even though the latter mostly concede the existence of these behavioral finance ef-
fects too. Taking for example the house money effect (statement [1]), endorsers approve this 
with a mean answer of 2.59, whereas non-endorsers give a mean answer of 3.13 – indiffe-
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rence between approval and contradiction would occur at a value of 3.50. The difference be-
tween both groups is significant at the 5% level.6
Remarkably, the perception of herding is by far strongest compared to other biases. All 
fund managers agree with a mean of 2.02 to statement [5]. Again, the difference between 
both groups is statistically significant as endorsers perceive herding among fund managers 
stronger than non-endorsers.
The results in Table 4 indicate that the major fraction of professional fund managers 
observes behavioral finance effects in their daily working environment. This may be interest-
ing in itself but our focus lies on the difference between the two groups distinguished: En-
dorsers of behavioral finance perceive these effects significantly stronger than non-endorsers.
We are not aware that this result has been shown before, although it may confirm expecta-
tions. Against the background of this finding the next section examines the impact from en-
dorsement of behavioral finance on fund managers’ self-assessment. Will endorsers be able 
to control and quell their psychologically motivated biases to rationalize their behavior in or-
der to optimize investment performance?
4. Views on one’s own behavior
The view on one’s own behavior provides a stunning contrast to the view on the market 
(see Section 3): We do not find any significant differences between endorsers and non-
endorsers in our sample, with one exception, i.e. the issue of miscalibration.
The answers to the following five items provide pretty consistent results about fund 
managers’ self-assessment. Just as for the view on markets, we follow psychologists and be-
havioral economists and distinguish the self-assessment items in those of judgment and deci-
sion-making (see Table 5). The first part of this section shortly motivates these items, the 
second part gives empirical results.
4.1 Motivation
We refer to judgment biases with statement [6], question [7] and task [8] which serve 
to analyze the three facets of overconfidence as they have been discussed in the literature, 
                                                
6 As a referee notes, one may be concerned with the positive wording of statements in Table 4, as the observed 
tendency to agree with questions may reflect a bias in psychological measurement. However, this possibility is 
rather unlikely if one takes into account that these results do predict miscalibration and the choice of investment 
strategies in a meaningful way. Moreover, respondents rather deny the also positively worded statement 9 in 
Table 5 below. Finally, our study primarily focuses on differences between two groups.
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e.g. in Glaser and Weber (2007) and Menkhoff et al. (2006). Theory assumes that overconfi-
dence often appears in situations with rare or ambiguous feedback (Lichtenstein et al., 1982, 
Hirshleifer, 2001). However, portfolio manager frequently get unmistakable feedback to their 
decisions and forecasts and they cannot establish themselves in the market with bad perfor-
mance. In this context it seems plausible to expect that portfolio manger learn from their ex-
perience, thus being able to estimate the precision of their knowledge and abilities more ade-
quate (Deaves et al., 2005). But, as indicated by the self-deception theory, the driving forces 
behind overconfidence may be stronger than rational learning. Many cognitive mechanisms 
distort an adequate self-assessment, thereby rather supporting overconfidence to keep self-
esteem and respect of others after wrong decisions. Glaser et al. (2005) show in this respect 
that professional investors are even more overconfident than laymen in all the three interpre-
tations of overconfidence.
The first dimension of overconfidence is the illusion of control (Langer, 1975) imply-
ing the following aspects: The belief of being able to control random variables, such as mar-
ket trends, more than it is really possible, an unrealistic high estimation of one’s own success 
probability as well as an exaggerated optimism concerning the future (Glaser and Weber, 
2007). The psychological motivation for the illusion of control is the fact that people feel 
more comfortable in situations they can control. An aspect of this bias is the illusion of being 
able to explain events retrospectively which is also regarded as the origin of hindsight bias. 
Thus, we refer to overconfidence as illusion of control by statement [6]. Hindsight bias hind-
ers an efficient information procession and derogates rational learning (Fischhoff, 1982a). 
Empirical studies show that despite the knowledge of its origins and effects, the hindsight bi-
as cannot be easily reduced and that also professionals are subject to this bias (Fischhoff, 
1982b, Biais and Weber, 2007).
One further facet of overconfidence is the unrealistically positive self-evaluation, the so 
called better-than-average-effect (Taylor and Brown, 1988) which we address by question 
[7]. Especially concerning desirable skills people tend to estimate themselves above average. 
A prominent example for the better-than-average self-estimation is the study of Svenson 
(1981), in which 82% of participating students rank themselves to 30% of the safest drivers. 
Obviously, biased perception concerning one’s own skills is in high gear. From one’s own 
experience only others are subject to cognitive deception and behavioral biases. Thereby suc-
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cesses are referred to one’s own abilities whereas failures are ascribed to external circums-
tances (Pronin et al., 2002, Pronin, 2007).
Finally, overconfidence is often regarded as miscalibration which we test by using task
[8]. Miscalibration is a systematic overestimation of the precision of one’s own knowledge. 
In consequence, people underestimate the probability distribution of a random variable (Lich-
tenstein et al., 1982, Alpert and Raiffa, 1982). Experimental psychology adopted the method 
of confidence intervals to measure miscalibration. Investors signalize their miscalibration by 
stating too narrow confidence intervals for estimations of stock or stock index developments.
In the following we refer to two decision biases. When approaching disposition effect 
and home bias that we have already touched to assess the market (Section 3), we do not rely 
on the same items for self-assessment in order to prevent strategic answers by respondents.
Over the past 20 years, the most commonly mentioned behavioral finance explanation 
for the disposition effect is the prospect theory view with its core messages: loss aversion and 
reflection effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Weber and Camerer, 1998, Langer and We-
ber, 2005). Accordingly, loss aversion is responsible for risk seeking in case of losses and 
consequently for the tendency to holding loss positions too long. This behavior is attributed 
to the hope that loser assets will rise or even outperform the actual winners in the future.
Contrary, due to risk aversion in the domain of gains the realization of a secure profit is pre-
ferred to further holding a “winning” asset. This leads to selling winners too soon. Thus, in-
vestors change their risk attitude depending on the type of an outcome, the above elucidated 
reflection effect. Interestingly, Shefrin and Statman (1985) point out that prospect theory 
cannot explain the disposition effect by its own and consequently use several additional psy-
chological elements besides prospect theory, i.e. mental accounting, regret aversion and self-
control.7 Recent research provides further doubt on the direct one-to-one link between pros-
pect theory and disposition effect. Prospect theory does not always explain the disposition ef-
fect or does even predict opposite behavior (Barberis and Xiong, 2006, Hens and Vlcek, 
2006). We approach the disposition effect by statement [9], thereby in particular concerning 
risk aversion in the domain of gains.8
                                                
7  We thank a referee for making us aware of this point.
8 The exact formulation relies on Odean’s (1998, p.1777) discussion of the disposition effect: “If the investor is 
faced with a liquidity demand, and has no new information about either stock, she is more likely to sell the 
stock that is up.”
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Statement [10] refers to the home bias although with a different item than statement [4] 
from Table 4 above. We use the hypothetical question on international asset allocation here 
because fund managers are subject to restrictions of their clients who are not necessarily well 
informed about an optimal portfolio allocation or may be subject to regulation restricting in-
ternational diversification. Thus, managed portfolios might differ from the ones preferred by 
the fund managers themselves. To avoid such a distortion, we ask fund managers for their 
personally preferred portfolio allocation, explicitly mentioning to ignore their funds’ restric-
tions. According to the IAPM (International Asset Pricing Model) the optimal portfolio share 
of a country corresponds to the ratio of its market capitalization to world capitalization. Ger-
man investors’ portfolios should thus contain 4% of German stocks and 8% of German bonds 
(Lütje and Menkhoff, 2007).
For all three biases – overconfidence, disposition effect and home bias – there is clear 
evidence that they reduce risk-adjusted investment performance. In a series of studies the 
dismal effect of overconfidence has been revealed by Odean (1999), Biais et al. (2005), Biais 
and Weber (2007). Also Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) ascribe detrimental high trading ac-
tivity to overconfidence.9 Regarding the disposition effect, Odean (1998) discloses it as a 
source of suboptimal performance for individual investors. Shapira and Venezia (2001) find 
that both professionalism and experience diminish but do not eliminate the preference to real-
ize profits too soon. A similar result is shown by Feng and Seasholes (2005): While sophisti-
cation and trading experience eliminate the reluctance to realize losses they only reduce but 
fail to eliminate the propensity to realize gains. Sluggish reaction due to the disposition effect 
may even generate stock price “underreaction” to corporate news (Frazzini, 2006). Accord-
ingly, literature warns against the consequences of the disposition effect and proposes greater 
self-discipline as solution to reduce the costs of loss or regret aversion and relative unsuc-
cessfulness (Coval and Shumway, 2005, Locke and Mann, 2005). Scherbina and Jin (2006) 
study the effect of replacements of mutual fund managers. They demonstrate that new fund
managers sell the loser stocks they have inherited more readily, thus increasing future re-
turns. Finally, there is evidence that international portfolio diversification may increase port-
folio returns (depending of course on the benchmark country return) although emphasis is put 
on the advantage of international diversification due to imperfect return correlation between 
national markets (see Levy and Sarnat, 1970).
                                                
9 See Hilton (2007) for a more detailed discussion of overconfidence.
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4.2 Results
We now turn to results which are presented in the main part of Table 5. Starting with 
the bias “illusion of control”, is there any impact from being an endorser of behavioral 
finance on the degree of hindsight bias? By assessing statement [6] with a mean of 3.32 en-
dorsers of behavioral finance find the majority of economic news slightly more surprising
than non-endorsers (3.19). Illusion of control is not significantly lower for endorsers in this 
case although this tendency of information perception may seem desirable from the view-
point of behavioral finance (as well as from the efficient market hypothesis). Thus, our result
supports the persistence of the hindsight bias.
Question [7] sheds light on overconfidence as unrealistically positive self-evaluation. 
In absence of overconfidence it is to expect that fund managers evaluate their own perfor-
mance compared to that of their colleagues on average with 3, which is the coding for 
“equally good”. The results in Table 5 show, however, that fund managers evaluate them-
selves by a mean of 2.34, thus clearly signaling overconfidence. The difference between en-
dorsers and non-endorsers in this respect is negligible.
Task [8] serves to analyze the relation of miscalibration and the endorsement of beha-
vioral finance. In this case respondents had to estimate a 90% confidence interval for the 
quote of Germany’s main stock index DAX in one month ahead. Interestingly, endorsers
state a significantly wider interval than non-endorsers (means of 1165 and 769 points respec-
tively).10 The share of correctly made forecasts is 66.7% in the group of endorsers and 47.2% 
in the group of non-endorsers. As the share of wrong estimations exceeds 10% we confirm
miscalibration among professional fund managers in our sample (see e.g. Biais et al., 2005, 
Glaser et al., 2005) but show that miscalibration is significantly lower for endorsers of beha-
vioral finance. This may be understood as successful learning by endorsers.
Turning to the disposition effect, i.e. statement [9], our groups do not differ in their as-
sessment of the degree to be subject to the disposition effect themselves. They both rather 
deny it to hold too long on losing positions (means of 4.03 and 4.07 respectively). In contrast, 
they observe a related bias - the reflection effect- much clearer in the behavior of others (see 
Section 3, statement [3]).
                                                
10  Excluding the extreme 10% answers from the distribution, leaving the inner 90%, the Mann-Whitney U-test 
also shows a significant difference between the answers of the groups in the miscalibration task. The median in 
the group of endorsers is 760 points and 625 points in the group of non-endorsers.
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Finally, also the result for statement [10] does not differ between our two groups. Both 
groups equally strongly overweigh the home country in their portfolios. This finding is con-
trasted by results on statement [4] in Table 4, whereupon home bias is observed in fund man-
agement.
All this raises the question why overconfidence as miscalibration seems to be a bias 
that is easier to overcome than other behavioral patterns? Psychologists claim that people 
want to think well of themselves and generally succeed in doing so, which is particularly dif-
ficult to overcome by learning when asking for a direct comparison between self versus oth-
ers (Pronin et al., 2002, 2004). Hence, e.g. overconfidence as better-than-average effect or 
the denial of the disposition effect in one’s own behavior can be regarded as consequence of 
the wish to see oneself in a better light upon which the knowledge of these biases has no sig-
nificant influence. The contrasting finding on the calibration task could thus be due to its
formulation which does not directly ask to assess one’s own skills as statements 6 and ques-
tion 7 do. Therefore, this task might not activate the person-positivity bias, i.e. the affinity of 
individuals to assess themselves in far more positive terms than they assess most other people 
(Taylor and Brown, 1988). This could be the reason for why learning succeeds in the misca-
libration task. Thus, if we regard the ambition to guard self-esteem as motivation to perform 
well in self-assessment, then in case of miscalibration endorsers of behavioral finance are,
first, better informed how to attain a good result in this task, i.e. to forecast correctly, and, 
second, they are not (or less) hindered by cognitive self-esteem guarding mechanisms when 
answering this task. As a result, due to their greater awareness of miscalibration and the mi-
nor cognitive resistance to this task, endorsers state significantly wider (and thereby better) 
confidence intervals than non-endorsers.
In summary, we do not observe an impact of the endorsement of behavioral finance on 
one’s own behavior. Rather, both groups – endorsers and non-endorsers – negate behavioral 
biases like the disposition effect in their own investment behavior. This creates a discrepancy 
between the view on the market and that on oneself, i.e. a clear disclosure of the bias blind 
spot. Thus, fund managers do not behave principally different from other people, despite 
their strong performance control and bonus incentives to rationalize behavior.11 Thus, ration-
                                                
11 Pronin et al. (2002) as well as Ehrlinger et al. (2005) reveal for “normal” people that even with knowledge of 
the relevant biases their perception in the behavior of others is always stronger than their recognition in one’s 
own behavior. Furthermore, test persons fail to agree to this biased self-perception and hold on to judge their 
self-assessment as objective and accurate.
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al learning is difficult in case of self-perception (Ehrlinger et al., 2005) – here shown for fund 
managers.
5. Consequence on investment behavior
The purpose of this section is to analyze whether the endorsement to behavioral finance 
has any effect on practical investment behavior. As we find such effects, this serves as a cre-
dibility test of the bias blind spot – no impact on perception of own behavior – because en-
dorsers obviously do behave differently in accordance with their conviction.
In this section investment behavior is grasped by two items, addressing information 
sources and investment strategies. It is known in this respect that fund managers primarily 
base their decision on fundamental information (e.g. Menkhoff, 1998, Arnswald, 2001). 
However, due to the increasing recognition of behavioral effects on price formation in finan-
cial markets (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001, Barberis and Thaler,
2003, Shiller, 2003) the importance of non-fundamental information, such as technical analy-
sis and technical trading strategies (e.g. momentum trading) may be even growing (early evi-
dence in Grinblatt et al., 1995, Keim and Madhavan, 1995). Because of their stronger percep-
tion of behavioral anomalies in financial markets we expect endorsers trying to profitably 
exploit the observed anomalies and thus to rely more on non-fundamental sources of infor-
mation and investment strategies.
In detail, Table 6 gives task [11] with the four important sources of information as re-
vealed by fund managers in ex-ante interviews. From the same set of interviews we derive 
most popular investment strategies as addressed by question [12] in Table 7.
Table 6 shows at first sight the superior role of fundamental facts as source of informa-
tion for all fund managers. Compared to non-endorsers, the group of endorsers relatively 
stronger uses technical indicators (mean of 2.84 vs. 3.26), whereby it assesses colleagues 
(mean of 3.38) and other market participants (mean of 3.93) as relatively less relevant 
sources of information. Even if these differences are not significant, the tendency to reject the 
no-difference hypothesis is relatively obvious in some cases, e.g. regarding the p-value of the 
Mann-Whitney U-Test of 0.125 for technical indicators. Colleagues and other market partici-
pants can be interpreted as sources of external confirmation for own decisions (Arnswald,
2001). Their relatively minor importance for endorsers might result from the fact that the lat-
ter relatively stronger perceive the behavior of other market participants as biased (Table 4). 
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Therewith, the quality of these sources of information is lower for endorsers. In this sense 
their endorsement of behavioral finance has a recognizable influence, although it is not statis-
tically significant.12
Table 7 contains results about the use of the popular investment strategies in fund man-
agement. We see that the three main strategies as identified in interviews, i.e. buy-and-hold, 
momentum and contrarian trading, are of almost equal importance to our sample of fund 
managers. When we look at endorsers only, however, they prefer the technical trading strate-
gies momentum and contrarian trading to a significantly higher degree than non-endorsers. 
This is consistent with their market assessment in Section 3 (Table 4) where they significant-
ly stronger regard markets as being influenced by behavioral finance effects. In particular, 
the more intensive use of the momentum strategy seems plausible regarding the significantly 
stronger perception of herding in fund management (statement [5] in Table 4).
6. Conclusion
Recent empirical research in the field of behavioral finance has shown that professional 
investors are (just as well as private ones) subject to irrational, psychologically motivated bi-
ases in their investment decisions (e.g. Glaser et al., 2005, Haigh and List, 2005, Menkhoff et 
al., 2006). Even though professionalism may reduce biases to some degree it does not elimi-
nate them entirely (Shapira and Venezia, 2001, 2006, Feng and Seasholes, 2005). This paper 
offers another perspective on the role of behavioral biases in finance by examining the im-
pact from endorsement of behavioral finance on the perception of markets’ and one’s own 
behavior.
We provide evidence on this issue by examining survey data of more than 100 German 
fund managers. Distinguishing the respondents in two groups, endorsers and non-endorsers
of behavioral finance, we test for differences in their answers with respect to perceived mar-
ket-wide biases, self-assessment, information processing and investment strategies. Interes-
tingly, there is no difference in personal characteristics between the two groups. Our findings 
show that the endorsement of behavioral finance has a significant impact on professionals’ 
perception of markets, but that it hardly influences the view on one’s own behavior. This 
                                                
12 If we aggregate the four sources of information into a composite score (fundamental facts plus technical in-
dicators minus colleagues minus other market participants) the difference between endorses and non-endorsers
becomes significant (p-value of 0.054): Compared to non-endorsers, endorsers assign relatively less importance 
to colleagues and other market participants than to fundamental facts and technical indicators.
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finding holds although endorsers do behave differently from non-endorsers in the expected 
direction with respect to preferred information sources and investment strategies.
So far our findings clearly support the hypothesis that many behavioral biases are diffi-
cult to overcome by learning, even though the fund managers analyzed here have very strong 
incentives to learn efficient behavior. However, results do not only feed pessimism about the 
capabilities of financial professionals. One indication of learning is the significantly lower 
degree of miscalibration shown by endorsers. Moreover, their stronger reliance on technical 
analysis and trading strategies may not conform to expectations derived from the efficient 
market hypothesis; however, this behavior seems consistent with their endorsement of beha-
vioral finance.
The results of our study demonstrate the persistence of behavioral patterns even with 
knowledge of their existence and thus their dominance over rational learning (in this sample). 
The failure to recognize own biases prevents from striving to correct them (Fischhoff, 1982b, 
Pronin, 2007). The challenge for professional fund managers, in particular for those with in-
sight in behavioral finance, consists therefore in a more critical assessment of own invest-
ment behavior in order to discipline and rationalize it.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of respondents
Item asked Responses (in per cent) Number of 
responses
Age (in years) <35: 50.9 35-45: 46.5 >45: 2.6 114
Professional experience (in years) <5: 22.3 5-15: 59.8 >15: 17.9 112
Gender Male: 92.1 Female: 7.9 114
Share of bonus payment Mean: 25.8 Std. dev.: 14.5 85
University degree Yes: 84.8 No: 15.2 112
Governing position Yes: 36.9 No: 63.1 103
Kind of fund management (primarily) Active: 93.7 Passive: 6.3 111
Kind of securities managed* Stocks: 66.5 Bonds: 33.5 115
Note: *4.2% of the respondents managed stocks and bonds to the same degree. These respondents were added 
with half weight to stocks as well as bonds, so that the sum adds up to 100%.
TABLE 2. Endorsers and non-endorsers
[BF1] Statement: “The research findings in behavioral finance reflect decision behavior in fund man-
agement”.
[BF2] Statement: “I’ve already concerned myself with behavioral finance, the key messages are well 
known to me”.
                Distribution of responses (frequencies)
BF1: Research findings reflect 
decision behavior in fund management
1 2 3 4 5 6 ∑
BF2:
Key messages of be-
havioral finance are 
well known to
respondent
1 5 20 7 2 0 - 34
2 1 11 17 4 2 - 35
3 0 2 9 5 5 - 21
4 0 1 4 5 4 - 14
5 0 0 2 0 1 - 3
6 - - - - - - -
∑ 6 34 39 16 12 - 107
complete approval                complete contradiction
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TABLE 3. Characteristics of endorsers and non-endorsers
Statements
encoding in [ ]
Response 
category
(a)
Responses H0: No 
difference
(b)
Binary probit 
regressions
(c)
All fund 
managers
Endorsers Non-
endorsers
Age in years
<35 [1], 35-45 [3], >45 [5]
Mean
N
2.04
114
2.08
37
2.09
66
-0.031
(0.975)
-0.208
(0.281)
-0.151
(0.349)
Professional experience in 
years <5 [1], 5-15, [3], >15 [5]
Mean
N
2.89
112
3.00
34
2.82
67
-0.725
(0.468)
0.260
(0.158)
0.158
(0.285)
Gender
male [1], female [2]
Mean
N
1.08
115
1.05
37
1.08
65
-0.437
(0.662)
1.019
(0.209)
0.150
(0.802)
Share variable 
compensation in %
Mean
N
25.78
85
28.35
30
25.53
49
-0.728
(0.467)
7.62*10-5
(0.995)
-
University degree
yes [1], no [2]
Mean
N
1.15
112
1.17
36
1.12
65
-0.604
(0.546)
0.211
(0.667)
0.213
(0.593)
Governing position
yes [1], no [2]
Mean
N
1.62
105
1.63
30
1.63
64
-0.077
(0.938)
0.130
(0.745)
-
Kind of fund management
(primarily) active [1], passive [2]
Mean
N
1.06
110
1.03
35
1.06
65
-0.718
(0.473)
-0.891
(0.305)
-0.603
(0.409)
Kind of securities managed
stocks [1], bonds [2]
Mean
N
1.34
114
1.30
35
1.40
67
-0.986
(0.324)
-0.210
(0.556)
-0.233
(0.434)
R² 0.062 0.024
[N] 67 93
(a) Responses in respective answering categories with analogical encoding in the first column.
(b) H0 states that there is no difference between the groups of endorsers and non-endorsers. The figures given are 
the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-test and the p-value in parenthesis.
(c) The table gives the coefficient of the binary probit regression and the p-value in parenthesis.
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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TABLE 4. Assessment of other fund managers’ behavior
[1] Statement: “After several profitable investments fund managers tend to take on additional positions”.
[2] Statement: “My colleagues pay particular attention to confirmatory news/information after having 
made an investment decision”. 
[3] Statement: “In case of loss positions other fund managers tend to increase their willingness to take 
risks”.
[4] Statement: “Fund managers prefer to invest in near located markets”.
[5] Statement: “Also fund managers exhibit herding behavior”. 
Statements Response 
category
(a)
Responses H0:
No difference
(b)All fund 
managers
Endorsers Non-
endorsers
[1] HOUSE MONEY EFFECT Mean
N
2.92
115
2.59
37
3.13
67
-2.107**
(0.035)
[2] CONFIRMATORY BIAS Mean
N
2.66
115
2.35
37
2.91
66
-2.483**
(0.013)
[3]   REFLECTION EFFECT Mean
N
3.44
114
3.00
37
3.71
65
-2.639***
(0.008)
[4] HOME BIAS Mean
N
3.34
116
3.03
37
3.54
67
-1.745*
(0.081)
[5] HERDING Mean
N
2.02
116
1.81
37
2.19
67
-1.841*
(0.066)
(a) There are 6 answering categories, ranging from “complete approval” (coded as 1) to “complete contradic-
tion” (coded as 6). Thus, a mean of 3.5 or less indicates rather approval to the statement. N is the number of 
responses.
(b) H0 states that there is no difference between the groups of endorsers and non-endorsers. The figures given are 
the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-test and the p-value in parenthesis.
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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TABLE 5. Assessment of one’s own behavior
[6] Statement: “The majority of economic news is not surprising for me”.
[7] Question: “How do you evaluate your own performance compared to other asset managers?”
[8] Task: “Give an estimation of the DAX in one month. Determine a lower und an upper bound 
such that the quote of the DAX in one month from now will be inside the resulting inter-
val with a probability of 90%”.
[9] Statement: “I prefer to take profits when I am confronted with unexpected liquidity demands”.
[10] Task: “Please, allocate an amount of 10 million € to the following markets so that the shares sum 
up to 100% (thereby ignore your funds’ restrictions)”. Germany, Europe (without Germa-
ny), USA and Canada, Asia, Emerging Markets.
Statements Response
category
(a)
Responses H0:
No difference
(b)All fund 
managers
Endorsers Non-
endorsers
[6] ILLUSION OF CONTROL
(HINDSIGHT BIAS)
Mean
N
3.20
115
3.32
36
3.19
67
-0.353
(0.724)
[7] BETTER-THAN-AVERAGE Mean
N
2.34
111
2.29
35
2.37
66
-0.621
(0.534)
[8] MISCALIBRATION Mean
N
887
111
1165
37
769
64
-2.816***
(0.005)
[9] DISPOSITION EFFECT Mean
N
3.99
116
4.03
37
4.07
67
-0.014
(0.989)
[10] HOME BIAS (GERMANY) (c) Mean in %
N
14.21
111
14.60
36
14.30
64
-0.230
(0.818)
(a) There are 6 answering categories, ranging from “complete approval” (coded as 1) to “complete contradic-
tion” (coded as 6). Thus, a mean of 3.5 or less indicates rather approval to the statement. 
Statement 7: 5 answering categories: much better (coded as 1), slightly better (coded as 2), equally good 
(coded as 3), slightly worse (coded as 4), much worse (coded as 5). N is the number of responses.
(b) H0 states that there is no difference between the groups of endorsers and non-endorsers. The figures given are 
the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-test and the p-value in parenthesis.
(c) Concerning the weighting of other countries there are also no significant differences between the groups.
Note: All managers’ mean answer for statements [9] and [10] lies not between the means of the comparison 
groups due to adjustment of the group “endorsers” by 3 answers (Table 2.).
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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TABLE 6. Assessment of information sources
[11] Task: “Please, assess the importance of the following sources of information for you”.
Answering categories: “Fundamental facts about the company / market”, “Technical indicators”, 
“Colleagues from the own company”, “Other market participants, not from the own company”.
Sources of information Response 
category
(a)
Responses H0: 
No difference
(b)
All fund 
managers
Endorsers Non-
endorsers
Fundamental facts Mean
N
1.82
115
1.86
37
1.87
67
-0.588
(0.557)
Technical indicators Mean
N
3.02
114
2.84
37
3.26
66
-1.533
(0.125)
Colleagues Mean
N
3.17
115
3.38
37
3.07
67
-1.147
(0.251)
Other market participants Mean
N
3.73
115
3.93
37
3.61
67
-1.258
(0.208)
(a) There are 6 answering categories, ranging from “highest relevance” (coded as 1) to “no relevance” 
(coded as 6). N is the number of responses.
(b) H0 states that there is no difference between the groups of endorsers and non-endorsers. The figures given 
are the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-test and the p-value in parenthesis.
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
TABLE 7. Assessment of investment strategies
[12] Question: “How intensive do you use several strategies? Please, allocate 100%.”
Answering categories: “ % Momentum strategy”, “ % Buy-and-Hold strategy”,
“ % Contrarian strategy (Value strategy)”, “ % Others”.
Investment strategies Response 
category
(a)
Responses H0:
No difference
(b)All fund 
managers
Endorsers Non-
endorsers
Momentum Mean in %
N
26.27
108
29.49
36
23.92
62
-2.033**
(0.042)
Contrarian Mean in %
N
29.31
108
34.28
36
26.96
62
-2.395**
(0.017)
Buy-and-Hold (c) Mean in %
N
30.73
108
23.54
36
32.96
62
-1.159
(0.243)
Others Mean in %
N
13.69
108
12.69
36
16.16
62
-0.113
(0.910)
(a) N is the number of responses.
(b) H0 states that there is no difference between the groups of endorsers and non-endorsers. The figures given are 
the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-test and the p-value in parenthesis.
(c) The standard deviation for the buy-and-hold strategy is much larger than that for momentum and contrarian 
strategies, which explains the insignificant difference of groups’ answers in this case.
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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APPENDIX 1. Comparison of the sample with the industry's structure
Structure of the German asset management industry:
- by assets under management
Structure of data sample: H0: No difference
(b)
-0.325 (0.745)- by assets under management
- by company size (b)
Small player 
[12]
Medium player 
[24]
Big player 
[8]
- by company size2) 5 13 8
H0: no difference
(c)
2.981 (0.225)
Participation in the survey: Pearson correlation coefficient with company size
(by asset under management, p-value in parentheses)
- by number of questionnaires per company 0.472***  (0.001)
The market data is based on the annual report of the German investment and asset management association 
(BVI) as of 2002.
(a) The table gives the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-test with the p-value in parentheses. 
(b) Here we focus on the company size of BVI member firms (ex those managing special funds only). The 
groups are clustered as follows: small players (mutual fund market share < 0.1%), medium players (mutual 
fund market share <= 2.5%), and big players (mutual fund market share > 2.5%) with numbers given in 
squared bracket.
(c) The table gives the test statistic of the chi-square test with the p-value in parentheses.
Stars refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
